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ABSTRACT
We present a method to detect anomalies in a time series of flow interaction patterns. There are many
existing methods for anomaly detection in network traffic, such as number of packets. However, there
is non established method detecting anomalies in a time series of flow interaction patterns that can be
represented as complex network. Firstly, based on proposed multivariate flow similarity method on temporal
locality, a complex network model (MFS-TL) is constructed to describe the interactive behaviors of traffic
flows. Having analyzed the relationships between MFS-TL characteristics, temporal locality window and
multivariate flow similarity critical threshold, an approach for parameter determination is established.
Having observed the evolution of MFS-TL characteristics, three non-deterministic correlations are defined
for network states (i.e. normal or abnormal). Furthermore, intuitionistic fuzzy set (IFS) is introduced to
quantify three non-deterministic correlations, and then a anomaly detection method is put forward for single
characteristic sequence. To build an objective IFS, we design a Gaussian distribution-based membership
function with a variable hesitation degree. To determine the mapping of IFS’s clustering intervals to
network states, a distinction index is developed. Then, an IFS ensemble method (IFSE-AD) is proposed
to eliminate the impacts of the inconsistent about MFS-TL characteristic to network state and improve
detection performance. Finally, we carried out extensive experiments on several network traffic datasets for
anomaly detection, and the results demonstrate the superiority of IFSE-AD to state-of-the-art approaches,
validating the effectiveness of our method.
INDEX TERMS network traffic flow, flow interaction, complex network, anomaly detection, multivariate
flow similarity, temporal locality, intuitionistic fuzzy set, ensemble method.
I. INTRODUCTION
Anomalies can be defined as some patterns in data that do not
imitate network traffic normal behavior. Network operators
frequently face a wide range of such patterns in network
traffic. Most of anomalous patterns begin abnormalities due
to malicious illegitimate activities under large scale traffic
flow interactions, such as cyber intrusions, distributed denial
of services attacks, botnet attacks, worm propagation, port
malicious scanning, and brute-force attacks [1], [2]. Which
could lead to catastrophic consequences and threaten the
proper operation of networks. Anomaly detection is a method
to find patterns that deviate from the expected behavior. Al-
though network traffic profiling has become one of the most
important and common means for anomaly detection in the
past years [3], new and more robust detection mechanisms
need to be developed as the complexity of these attacks keeps
increasing as discussed in Cisco 2017 Midyear Cybersecurity
report [4].
In general, the studies of network traffic profiling can
be classified by their level of observation: (a) packet level,
such as signature-based application detection and methods
using the well known port numbers, (b) flow level statistical
techniques (c) host level, such as host-profiling approaches.
The above methods focus on the feature extraction, selection,
and analysis on per study object (e.g. packet, flow or host),
and ignore the interaction of network traffic. In this paper,
the interaction refers to the dependency between two flows
or relevance from one flow to another. For example the worm
virus hiding in a host will firstly send a large number of
scanning flows to other hosts, and then inject worm code
VOLUME 4, 2016 1
ar
X
iv
:1
81
0.
07
79
6v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 12
 Se
p 2
01
8
J. Wang et al.: Using Intuitionistic Fuzzy Set for Anomaly Detection of Network Traffic from Flow Interaction
into the vulnerable hosts depending on the scanning response
flows. And in both the case of malcode and P2P, using content
signature methods seem destined to fail in the face of en-
cryption and polymorphism. Therefore, from the perspective
of traffic flow interactions, we construct a complex network
model to describe the interaction behaviors of large scale
network traffic flows instead of traditional statistical method.
Since complex network provides a powerful mechanism for
capturing the interactive relationships among study objects,
it has been an effective method for relational expression of
structured data [5]–[7], especially the time series data. For
instance, Supriya et al. [6] translated the epileptic EEG signal
time series into complex network, and then used the statis-
tical properties of complex network to detect the epilepsy.
Whereas in Internet, based on complex networks theory, the
complexity of Internet topologies have been widely studied
[8], [9]. But there is few studies about the complexity of
network traffic. In 2007, a study of the social behavior of
Internet hosts was presented by the Traffic Dispersion Graphs
(TDGs) as a way to monitor, analyze, and visualize network
traffic [10]. In TDGs, the edge can be defined to show
different interactions between two hosts. Wang et al. [11]
studied social behavior similarity of Internet end-hosts based
on behavioral graph analysis. In Reference [12], we studied
the flow interactive behaviors on temporal locality and put
forward the temporal locality complex network (TLCN) to
monitor, analyze, and visualize large scale network traffic
flows. But in TLCN, some network flows that are not relevant
in flow content could also build connections due to TLCN
definition. For this reason, by focusing on the interaction
behaviors of similar flows on temporal locality, an improved
complex network model (MFS-TL) for large scale network
flows is developed in which the proposed multivariate flow
similarity method is used to quantify the correlation among
the flows on temporal locality.
Obviously, the anomaly detection for network traffic flows
is to detect the anomalous MFS-TL structure. Recently years,
constructing complex networks from structured data and then
mining the nonconforming patterns by complex network
statistical characteristics have become an effective means
for anomaly detection [13]. For instance cyber networks,
fraud detection, fault detection in medical claims, engineer-
ing systems, sensor networks, climate network, and many
more domains. However, one of key challenges is the incon-
sistent performance about multiple network characteristics
to network states [9], [14], [15], when each of network
characteristics is regarded as the constituent detector alone.
Specifically, some characteristic values present negative
correlation with detection goals. In other words, this charac-
teristic could indicate that network is normal/abnormal but in
fact it is abnormal/normal. Some have non-correlation with
the detection goals, i.e. the unuseful characteristics could
bring non-deterministic for network states [16]. Hence it can
be inferred that the good characteristics improve the detection
accuracy, the bad ones strength the certainty for the opposite
state, but the others bring the uncertainty for judging network
state. Undoubtedly, it become an uncertain theory problem of
multiple complex network characteristics to multiple states.
In this paper, the intuitionistic fuzzy set (IFS) [17]
is adopted to describe above non-deterministic correlation
problem. Its key is that similar networks probably share
certain characteristics [6]. Different from [18], where it is
given a non-null hesitation part about the evaluation of study
objects to define the indeterministic behavior, we use the
hesitation degree of IFS to express the useless of unuseful
characteristic, and the non-membership degree of IFS to rep-
resent the negative correlation about the characteristic to one
certain network state (i.e. normal or abnormal). Meanwhile a
new membership function is designed to resolve the problem
of the hesitation degree being a fixed value. A distinction
index is put forward for the purpose of multiple clustering
intervals being mapped to two states’ linguistic variables.
Furthermore, the intuitionistic fuzzy weighted geometric
(IFWG) operator [19] is introduced to fuse multiple IFSs
into one new IFS about network structure to network state
to eliminate the impacts of the inconsistent performance.
To obtain the detection result, we use score function and
precision function to select best IFS which has maximum
membership degree for a given network state (or linguistic
variable). Thus based on the intuitionistic fuzzy set, the
detection method of single MFS-TL characteristic (IFS-AD)
and the ensemble method of multiple characteristics (IFSE-
AD) are separately developed to find the abnormal MFS-TL.
We apply our methods to detect the anomalies in publicly
network traffic trace datasets, where it utilizes 14 network
characteristic metrics. Extensive evaluation on datasets with
ground truth shows that IFSE-AD outperformance the other
methods. The main contributions of this paper include:
1) Construct a complex network model (MFS-TL) to de-
scribe the interaction behaviors of large scale similar
flows on temporal locality. The MFS-TL can monitor,
analyze, and visualize network flow behaviors from the
perspective of the protocol, application, flow type, and
flow payload.
2) Put forward a quantification method about MFS-TL
characteristic to network state based on intuitionistic
fuzzy set (IFS). In which, the proposed distinction
index resolves the mapping problem from multiple
clustering intervals of the IFS to two states’ linguistic
variables.
3) Propose an ensemble method (IFSE-AD) for multiple
characteristic IFSs to improve detection performance.
The IFSE-AD resolves the inconsistent problem of
MFS-TL characteristic presenting network state.
4) Methodological identification of an appropriate mul-
tivariate flow similarity critical threshold rc and tem-
poral locality window ∆w. To evaluate the efficiency
of the proposed methods in detecting the anomalies of
publicly datasets including the abnormal events of the
cyber intrusions, botnet attacks, distributed denial of
services, brute force attack.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Second II
provides a thorough literature review of the related work.
Section III constructs a complex network model (MFS-TL) to
describe the interaction behaviors of large scale similar flows
on temporal locality. In Section IV, based on intuitionistic
fuzzy set, we develope a anomaly detection method for single
MFS-TL characteristic, and a ensemble detection method
for multiple MFS-TL characteristics’ IFSs which improves
the detection performance. Furthermore, the MFS-TL pa-
rameters and statistical characteristics are analyzed, and our
method performance are shown and evaluated in Section V.
Finally, Section VI presents the concluding remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
Network traffic anomalies are instances in data that do
not conform to the behavior exhibited by normal traffic.
Traffic anomalies in a network can be defined as any net-
work events or operation that deviate from the normal net-
work behavior. They happen due to the growing number
of network-based attacks or intrusions. Nowadays, the net-
work anomaly detection methods can be classified into the
statistic-, classification-, clustering-, soft computing-, fuzzy
set theory-, and combination learners-based [1], [20]. In
general, the first step is that the raw data is reduced by one of
the three important strategies, i.e. dimensionality reduction
(e.g. feature selection and feature extraction), clustering, and
sampling, on packet-level, flow-level or host-level. However,
the selected features or quantified metrics are usually used as
the individual indicator [21]–[24].
In recent years, network traffic profiling based on the
probability relationships of studied objects has been paid
attention. That is because complex network has been an ef-
fective method for relational expression of structured data as
complex network theory provides a powerful mechanism for
capturing the interactive relationships among study objects
[13]. For instance the communication among the hosts. In
a study of the traffic volume between each pair of hosts
and traffic flows on all ports, Yin et al. [25] developed the
VisFlowConnect tool for visualizing network traffic flow
dynamics for situational awareness that on all protocols and
dynamic evolution on time. Iliofotou et al. [10] proposed the
Traffic Dispersion Graph (TDG) to discover network-wide
interactions of the hosts to monitor, analyze, and visualize
network traffic. Wang et al. [11] studied social behavior
similarity of Internet end-hosts based on behavioral graph
analysis. Guan et al. [26] constructed a directed graph model
from the bidirectional region flows where a node denotes one
host located at either source region or destination region and
the edges represent the number of packets transferred from
the source host to destination host. In addition, probability
graph is used to depict the relationship of the flow attributes
(as the nodes). The studies of [27], [28] presented the pro-
posed time series graph to describe the relationships among
multi-time series such as the source IP address, destination
IP address, source port, destination port. Di et al. [29] put
forward the flow graphs in the following way: each mobile
phone number in records represents a user node; each server
IP address in the records represents a server node; each flow
record between a user node and a server node forms an
edges. Tsuruta et al. [30] defined packets sent by coordinated
malware attacks as bridge-less connected bipartite graphs.
The structure-based screening is a method for extracting only
packets that constitute 2-edge connected components of a
bipartite graph. Nowadays, the visibility graph is also used
in the network traffic analysis. Ye et al. [31] constructed the
complex network for traffic sequences based on visibility
graph. Then the complex network features is used to analyze
the host behavior in the traffic sequence.
In summary, the researchers have used the complex net-
work theory to study the interaction behaviors of packet-level
and host-level, or the probability relationship of the statistical
results. However, in [12], we proposed the temporal locality
complex network for flow-level interaction which can effec-
tively determine the Internet applications and discover the
attack patterns. In this paper, we constructed the complex
network model of multivariate flow similarity on temporal
locality to improve the ability of flow interaction presenting.
Thus, the problem of network traffic anomaly detection is
converted into the anomaly detection for complex networks.
In fact, the anomaly detection for complex networks has
become a hot topic [9], [13]. Bunke [32] used graph features
generated by graph edit distance to classify the normal and
abnormal. Dai et al. [33] unified both positive and negative
mutual dependency relationship in an unsupervised frame-
work to detect anomalous nodes of bipartite graphs such as
users-rating-products in online marketplaces, users-clicking
webpages on the WWW and users referring-users in social
networks. Eberle and Holder [34] discovered anomalies in
graphs and patterns of varying sizes with minimal to no false
positive by using the minimum description length principle
and probabilistic approaches. Gunnemann et al. [35] pro-
posed a method for finding homogeneous groups by join-
ing the paradigms of subspace clustering, i.e. we determine
sets of nodes that show high similarity in subsets of their
dimensions and that are as well densely connected within the
given graph. Li et al. [36] developed an iBlackhole-DC algo-
rithm for finding black hole and volcano patterns in a large
directed network. Sun et al. [37] identified abnormal nodes
by computing the neighborhood for each node using random
walk with restarts and graph partitioning. Reference [38]
proposed the density-based network clustering algorithm to
detect communities, hubs, and outliers in large scale undi-
rected networks. Wang et al. [39] proposed a heterogeneous
review graph to capture the relationships among reviewers,
reviewers and stores, and then put forward an iterative model
to identify suspicious reviewers. Supriya et al. [6] made the
epileptic EEG signals transform into the complex network
and then used the statistical properties to detect the epilepsy.
In terms of network traffic anomaly detection, some stud-
ies based on complex network theory have been done by the
researchers. For example, based on the TDG, Le et al. [40]
had used complex network metrics, such as degree distribu-
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tion, maximum degree and dK−2 distance, to detect anoma-
lous network traffic. In the study of network-wide anomaly
detection, Zhou [41] detected the network anomalies based
on routers’ connecting relationships, i.e. he used the graph
to describe the traffic feature distribution sequences and their
relationships. Reference [26] used the six features proposed
based on the regional flow model to describe the network
traffic patterns and to capture the dynamic traffic patterns,
especially the changes caused by attacks. Ishibashi et al. [42]
extracted communication structure to identify low intensity
anomalous network events, which can not be detected with
conventional volume-based anomaly detection schemes. In
a word, the complex network is an effective means for the
anomaly detection of structured data.
III. MULTIVARIATE FLOW SIMILARITY MODEL ON
TEMPORAL LOCALITY
In this paper, multivariate flow similarity on temporal locality
is used to quantify the interactive behaviors among similar
flows at local time. In the below a specific example of flow
interaction is given, i.e., the traffic flow interaction under
Google search. During opening the Google.com, the browser
firstly looks up the IP address of Google.com by the DNS
flows, and loads Google’s webpage by HTTP flows. Then,
it sends the HTTP request flows again to obtain the search
results for the given keywords. Next, we probably click some
hyperlinks on search page to trigger new flows. Eventually,
we may repeatedly request new flows decided by previous
flow content until we obtain our wanted results. Obviously,
the flows in each step depend on the previous flows, that is
to say the previous flows trigger the further flows. Another
example is the recursive or iterative query of DNS resolver.
The DNS server has to forward this requests to its provider
or tell the user its provider, if there is no record for a
given domain name [43]. In fact, the interactions in large
scale traffic flows are so complicated that the traditional
statistical methods are very hard to describe the macroscopic
relationships. But the complex network has a good nature to
depicting the complexity and interaction of large scale traffic
flows. Thus, based on complex network theory we propose
the construction method of multivariate flow similarity model
on temporal locality in the following.
A. MODEL DEFINITION
First, a 6-tuple f = {sa, da, sp, dp, pr, ps} is defined to
denote one network traffic flow, where the sa, da, sp, dp,
pr, and ps represent the source IP, destination IP, source
port, destination port, protocol number, and flow payload size
respectively. Then the set F = {f1, f2, . . . , fn} denotes n
traffic flow traces on time series. When we focus on traffic
flows of one Internet application (e.g., either of two ports is
a fixed value), the 6-tuple can be simplified into the 3-tuple
f = {sa, da, ps}. Here one unique flow can be identified by
the values of sa and da.
1) Temporal locality
Temporal locality is used to describe the interaction on a
per item basis apart from in an aggregate reference flow
[44]. In network traffic flows, the interactive relationships
are built from current flows to further flows. For two flows
fi and fj occurring at time ti and tj separately (ti ≤ tj
), if tj ∈ [ti, ti + ∆w], there would be the interactive
relationship from fi to fj , where the ∆w denotes the size
of temporal locality window. In other words, there will be a
directed connection from flow node fi to fj . However, the
captured network traffic flows are diverse, especially those
at the backbone network. Two flows fi and fj could be
irrelevant in flow content in despite of tj ∈ [ti, ti + ∆w]
or ti ∈ [tj , tj + ∆w]. In order to eliminate the impacts from
irrelevant flows, we design the multivariate flow similarity
method to filter the pseudo interactive relationships of the
flows by quantifying the similar probability of two flows.
2) Multivariate flow similarity
To determine true relationship of two flows, we propose a
multivariate flow similarity method by computing the similar
probability of features values of two flows, such as the source
and destination IP, source and destination port, protocol type,
and flow payload size.
Source and Destination IP addresses. Source and desti-
nation IP addresses have been widely used in the intrusion
detection domain. Whereas as a feature it does not provide
a definitive conclusion, it can be used as a reference in
network traffic flow profiling. Different from statistic-based
traffic anomaly detection, in this paper their primary value
comes from a similar probability to evaluate the relevance
of different flows. For example, the attack flows from single
attacker to multiple victims contain the attacker’s IP address.
Thus, we develope the below equation (1) to calculate flow
similarity on IP address.
ra(fi, fj) =
max{LCP1, LCP2, LCP3, LCP4}
L
(1)
Where the LCP1 = |sai ∩ saj | , LCP2 = |sai ∩ daj |,
LCP3 = |dai ∩ saj |, LCP4 = |dai ∩ daj | denote the length
of common prefix of two IP addresses, and the L is the IP
address length, i.e. 32 for IPv4 and 128 for IPv6.
Source and Destination port. In TCP/IP network, a port
number is a way to identify a specific application to which an
Internet or other network message is to be forwarded when
it arrives at a server. So the port number is usually used to
match the Internet services of the corresponding TCP or UDP
implementation, such as the 21 for FTP, 22 for SSH, 23 for
TELNET, 25 for SMTP, 53 for DNS, 80 for HTTP, 6881-
6889 for BT and 5554 for Worm Sasser. The flows from same
Internet services would like to interact each other. Thus, as
shown in equation (2), if existing two ports pi and pj in flows
fi and fj belong to same Internet services, the probability of
flow interaction is 1, otherwise 0.
rpo(fi, fj) =
{
1 if pi ∼= pj ,∃pi ∈ fi and ∃pj ∈ fj
0 otherwise
(2)
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Protocol. Similar to source-destination port pair, protocol
was widely used for filtering out non-related traffic, thus
reducing the volume of flows requiring further processing.
Sometimes the sheer presence of a specific protocol in traffic
raises suspicion. For example, IRC traffic is relatively rarely
used for legitimate purposes to the extend that in certain
networks there is no use for this protocol at all. So the
flows belonging to the same protocol in a monitored network,
especially the special protocols, are more probable to interact
each other.
rpr(fi, fj) =
{
1 pri = prj
0 otherwise
(3)
Flow payload size. The flow payload size are mostly
intended to represent similar communication patterns. This
metric has been used with the purpose of both traffic classifi-
cation (i.e. distinguish specific protocols, especially the P2P)
and traffic anomaly detection. That is because continuous
flows from one Internet application exhibit a very consistent
behavior. Here we use the ratio between two flows’ payload
sizes to exhibit the flow similarity.
rps(fi, fj) =
min{psi, psj}
max{psi, psj} (4)
Considering the normalization of the rps, in equation (4)
the minimum of two flows’ payload size is divided by the
maximum of that.
Furthermore, the multivariate similarity between two flows
can be calculated by the following equation:
r(fi, fj) = wa ∗ ra + wpo ∗ rpo + wpr ∗ rpr + wps ∗ rps, (5)
where the wa, wpo, wpr, and wps denote the weight of corre-
sponding flow feature respectively,wa+wpo+wpr+wps = 1.
A entropy weight method [45] is adopted to determine the
weights of equation (5). Furthermore, the interaction rela-
tionship of two flow nodes fi and fj is expressed as:
Eij =
{
1 tj ∈ [ti, ti + ∆w] and r(fi, fj) ≥ rc
0 otherwise
(6)
If Eij = 1, an connection is built from flow node fi to flow
node fj , and vice versa. Specifically, if only the similarity
r(fi, fj) between two flows is not less than a critical thresh-
old rc and the fj occurs in the temporal locality window
of the fi, there should be a directed connection from fi
to fj . The parameters ∆w and rc should be determined to
an proper value by which the complex network can capture
the characteristics of network traffic time series. We have
discussed it in detail in Section V-B.
According to the above method, a complex network model
g = (N,E) based on multivariate flow similarity on temporal
locality can be constructed from network traffic traces, where
the v ∈ N is the network node that denotes unique network
flow f , the e ∈ E describes a interaction relationship
between two nodes. In this paper the g is a directed complex
network, where the direction of edge e(vi, vj) indicates the
flow vi triggers the flow vj , the vj depends on the vi, or there
is an relevance. About MFS-TL, the most important is the
ability of describing macroscopic interactive structure, even
though it builds the connections from microscopic traffic
flows. Therefore, the MFS-TL can capture the interaction and
dynamic of large scale network traffic flows.
B. MODEL FILTRATION AND FORMATION
One of the fundamental questions in using MFS-TL is the
definitions of network node and edge. This basic question can
be answered in many different ways depending on the goal
of our study. We start with the observation that what kind or
level of network flows should be selected as network node
in MFS-TL. We call this process Node Filtering. One simple
node filtering is to select IP protocol flows. In addition to
this basic node filtering, we can enrich the definition of what
constitutes a node by imposing "stricter" rules that capture
different aspects of traffic flows. For instance, we can have
filters for "allowing" a flow node based on: (a) the frequency
of one flow, (b) the type of the flow (e.g., TCP three-way
handshake), (c) the application protocol used (TCP, UDP,
ICMP etc.), (d) the application based on port number (e.g.,
Port Number 80 for HTTP, Port Numbers 6881−6889 for
BT), and finally (e) looking at properties of the flow content,
such as payload size or by using deep packet inspection.
Besides basic definition about network edge in Section
III-A , more rules or features, called Edge Filtering, can
be put forward to enrich the definition of network edge.
In general, the directed edges can be used to identify the
indicator of the probability interaction between a pair of
flows. Directed edges in a MFS-TL are very useful in iden-
tifying various node behaviors and also in establishing their
causal relationship. However, we could choose to consider
undirected edges, which will enable us to use the more
extensively studied complex network metrics for undirected
networks, as discussed in later Section V-C. In addition to
edge direction, it is also important to define the level of
network edge in MFS-TL. One simple edge filter is to add an
edge e(vi, vj) between flow node vi and vj when Eij = 1
of equation (6). Once an edge is added, this filter ignores
any flow interaction from vi to vj . We call this edge filter
as the Unweighted-Edge(UWE), and is mainly used to study
the interactive process of network flows. However, for the
flow interaction behavior, the frequency of edge e(vi, vj) is
an important indicator in MFS-TL. We call this edge filter as
the Weighted-Edge(WE).
In this paper, we mainly focus on the interactions of the
traffic flows based on TCP and UDP application protocol.
In other words, the MFS-TL uses the (c) filtering type (as
defined above). Throughout the paper and unless stated other-
wise, when the legacy application for a flow uses the TCP or
UDP, we use the WE edge filter on the corresponding protocol
of the flows.
Since we use node filtering by application protocol and
edge filtering by the edge frequency, the MFS-TLs capture
aspects of any application that uses these protocol. However,
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application protocol-based filtering is consistent with our
use of MFS-TLs as a monitoring tool. For example, if at
some time points network traffic at TCP Port 80 appears
significantly different, it could be: (a) a new begin or mali-
cious application tunneling its traffic under that port, or (b) a
change in the behavior of the traditional traffic.
IV. ANOMALY DETECTION METHOD BASED ON
INTUITIONISTIC FUZZY SET
For a MFS-TL g = {N,E,C}, the C is the collection
of complex network characteristic metrics. If it is sam-
pled with a fixed time window 4t, one MFS-TL sequence
G = {g1, g2, . . . , gn} will be obtained by extracting MFS-
TL from network traffic samples, where the gi represents
the flow interactions of a monitored network at ith sample
period. Assume that there are p characteristic metrics for the
sampling MFS-TL gi. Then in n sampling MFS-TLs, existing
a characteristic vector C = {c}p×n denotes p time series of
MFS-TL characteristics. Every MFS-TL characteristic will
depict the MFS-TL structure from different perspectives. For
instance, the number of MFS-TL nodes and the number of
MFS-TL edges describe MFS-TL size. When one anomaly
activity occurs, a large number of nodes or edges will disap-
pear or appear suddenly in MFS-TL. The MFS-TL diameter
denotes the worst communication path length. Under the
intentional attacks, MFS-TL diameter will first increases and
then decreases quickly [9]. In Section V-C, the detailed anal-
ysis results denote that the correlation between network char-
acteristic and network states can be classified into tree types:
positive correlation, negative correlation and non-correlation,
and is non-deterministic in different datasets. Therefore, we
put forward the intuitionistic fuzzification method for single
MFS-TL characteristic to quantify three non-deterministic
correlations.
A. INTUITIONISTIC FUZZY SET FOR SINGLE
CHARACTERISTIC
Definition 1 (Intuitionistic Fuzzy Set, IFS): X is a finite
universal set, such as the network diameter values (X = Ci).
An intuitionistic fuzzy set A in X is an object having the
following form.
A = {< x, µA(x), γA(x), piA(x) > |x ∈ X} (7)
where the µA(x) : X → [0, 1] defines the degree of mem-
bership, and γA(x) : X → [0, 1] defines the degree of non-
membership of the element x ∈ X to intuitionistic fuzzy set
A, with the condition 0 ≤ µA(x)+γA(x) ≤ 1 for all x inX .
For each intuitionistic fuzzy set inX , piA(x) = 1−µAj−γAj
is called the hesitation degree(or intuitionistic index) of x to
A.
In order to obtain the IFS A of MFS-TL characteristic,
we define the domain of discourse, and then partition it.
First, the domain of discourse D = [xmin − ε1, xmax + ε2]
is constructed, where xmin and xmax are the minimum
and maximum of set X , and ε1 and ε2 are proper positive
numbers. Second, the intuitionistic fuzzy C-means clustering
algorithm(IFCM) [46] is used to partition the domain of
discourse into m clustering intervals. Meanwhile we get the
clustering center vector V = {v1, v2, . . . , vc} of universe D.
Then let
di =

xmin − ε1, i = 0
(vi + vi+1)/2, i = 1, 2, ...,m− 1
xmax + ε2, i = m
(8)
As a result, the universe D is divided into m unequal in-
tervals, i.e. D = {[d0, d1], [d1, d2], . . . , [dm−1, dm]}. Every
x ∈ X should exist m intuitionistic fuzzy sets Ai =
{< x, uAi(x), γAi(x), piAi(x)|x ∈ Di}, where the uAi(x)
denotes the membership degree of x in ith clustering interval
[di−1, di] and γAi(x) is the non-membership degree of that.
Existed methods of membership and non-membership
function usually give the hesitation degree a fixed value.
Objectively, the hesitation degree should be dynamic with
the universal set X . So we adopted the Gaussian function
(equation (9)) which meets below condition: when the dis-
tance between the x and the interval center v is lower, the
degree of membership µ is more close to 1.
uAi(x) = exp(−
(x− ψui)2
2σ2ui
) (9)
Where i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and ψui and σui are the function
parameters. Then the following rules are defined so as to
resolve above parameters:
1) If x is in the middle of an clustering interval, i.e. x =
vi, the membership value µAi(x) = 1.
2) If x is on the boundaries of an clustering interval, i.e.
x = (vi − vi−1)/2, let piAi(x) = α, (0 ≤ α ≤ 1), then
µAi(x) = (1− α)/2.
Based on above rules, the function parameters are resolved:
ψui = vi (10)
σui = −
(vi−1 + vi)2
8ln((1− α)/2) (11)
Thus, given a value x, the membership values for every
clustering interval are calculated by equations(9), (10) and
(11). The non-membership function is calculated based on
Yager generating function [47]. The Yager’s intuitionistic
fuzzy complement is written as following:
γAi(x) = (1− µβAi(x))1/β , β > 0 (12)
When µAi(x) = 1, then γAi(x) = 0, and otherwise vice
versa. Therefore the IFS (equation(7)) becomes:
Ai ={< x, µAi(x), (1− µβAi(x))1/β ,
1− µAi(x)− (1− µβAi(x))1/β > |x ∈ Di}
(13)
As we all known, one network is either normal or abnor-
mal. But the value of clustering intervals m is not less than
2 depending on our goals. When m = 2, one clustering
interval represents normal state and the other represents
abnormal state. When m > 2, as Fig.4 shown the anomaly
detection performance achieves the best when m = 10,
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how to partition m clustering intervals again to two states’
clustering interval set becomes an important problem for
anomaly detection. In other words, we need to know which
clustering intervals represent the normal state and the others
represent the abnormal state. Let the NC and AC denote
the normal clustering interval set and abnormal clustering
interval set, D = AC
⋃
NC and AC
⋂
NC = ∅. The
abnormal clustering interval set AC is that includes most of
the abnormal instances of the training set, and the normal
clustering interval setNC is that includes most of the normal
instances of the training set. For the ith abnormal clustering
interval in AC, the tti = AIi|ACi| and tfi =
NIi
|ACi| denote
the ratio of the number of abnormal instances AIi and the
number of normal instances NIi to total instances |ACi|.
Correspondingly, the ffj =
NIj
|NCj | and ftj =
AIj
|NCj | de-
note the ratio of the number of normal instances NIj and
the number of abnormal instances AIj to total instances
|NCj | of the jth normal clustering interval. For the two
states’ set, we get TT =
∑i∈AC
i=0 tti, TF =
∑i∈AC
i=0 tfi,
FF =
∑j∈NC
j=0 ffj and FT =
∑j∈NC
j=0 ftj . Furthermore,
a distinction index is designed for the purpose that finds the
best partitioning for the clustering intervals by obtaining the
maximum η = TT − TF + FF − FT .
τ =
η
TT + TF + FF + FT
, arg max
AC,NC
(η) (14)
In above equation, we found that the best case is there is
no normal instances in abnormal clustering interval set and
no abnormal instances in normal clustering interval set, i.e.
TT = 1, TF = 0, FF = 1, and FT = 0. When all instances
of training set distribute evenly, the TT , TF , FF , and FT
will be 0. Thus, the τ ∈ [0, 1] denotes distinction degree of
the clustering intervals to network states. The higher the τ is,
the better the clustering intervals’ partition is, and the more
significant the relevance of MFS-TL characteristic values to
network states is. Essentially, it is because the changes of the
characteristic values can reflect network states.
Here we find that the A, as the individual detector for
single MFS-TL characteristic, can give detection result by
selecting a IFS with maximum membership degree.
B. INTUITIONISTIC FUZZY SET ENSEMBLE FOR
MULTIPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Single MFS-TL characteristic as the individual detector alone
would be used to detect abnormal in some datasets. But the
studies of complex network anomaly detection indicate that
the changes of each of characteristics have the inconsistent
performance in same anomaly events [9], [14], [15]. So a
ensemble method of multiple characteristic IFSs is essential
for the purpose of eliminating the inconsistent.
For the temporal sequence of one MFS-TL characteristic
Ci, we can compute its domain of discourse Di and its
IFS Ai based on Section IV-A. Furthermore equation(13)
can be extended as following equation for multiple MFS-TL
characteristics:
Aij(c) = {< c, µAij (c), γAij (c), piAij (c) > |c ∈ Dj} (15)
Where the i = 1, 2, . . . , p, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and the Dj is the
jth clustering interval of one MFS-TL characteristic Ci. The
Aij(c) represents the IFS of the ith network characteristic c
to the jth clustering interval. In other words, the µAij (c) is
the membership function of ith network characteristic value
to jth clustering interval of network characteristic universe
Di, the γAij (c) is the non-membership function of ith net-
work characteristic value to jth clustering interval of the
universe Di, and the piAij (c) is the hesitation degree.
Finally, the intuitionistic fuzzy relationship A between
p MFS-TL characteristics and m clustering intervals are
calculated by carrying out the temporal sequence partition
and intuitionistic fuzzy set construction on the training set.
Hence, the above problem becomes the multi-IFSs reasoning
problem. Let C ′ = [c1 c2 . . . cp]T denotes the character-
istic values of a testing MFS-TL g′. Then we define the
equation (16) to compute the IFSs B of the characteristic
collection C ′ to m clustering intervals.
B = AC′ =

A11(c1) A12(c1) . . . A1m(c1)
A21(c2) A22(c2) . . . A2m(c2)
...
...
...
...
Ap1(cp)Ap2(cp) . . . Apm(cp)

T
(16)
Where the Bij denotes the membership, non-membership
and hesitation of the jth characteristic value to the i cluster-
ing interval, and then the Bi is the IFS that current network
depicted by p network characteristics is mapped to the ith
clustering interval. As a result, the B describes the intu-
itionistic fuzzy set between the network characteristics and
clustering intervals.
However, for multiple characteristic IFSs B, the sizes
of normal interval set NC and abnormal interval set AC
are usually different with different MFS-TL characteristic,
e.g. the size of the AC of network edge |ACedge| may
be not equal that of network diameter |ACdiameter|. Even
if their sizes are equal, the items of the set NC and AC
of each MFS-TL characteristic may not be one-to-one cor-
respondence to the domain of discourse D, e.g. i 6= j
where ACedge0 = D
edge
i and AC
diameter
0 = D
diameter
j . In
order to fuse multiple characteristics IFSs, we introduce the
intuitionistic fuzzy weighted average operator to separately
combine the intuitionistic fuzzy sets in clustering interval set
NC and AC. Furthermore, the IFSs B between p network
characteristics and m cluster intervals are translated into
the IFSs B′ with p network characteristics and two states’
linguistic variables L = {L1, L2} based on the distinction
index function (14) and intuitionistic fuzzy weighted average
operator.
B′ =

A′11(c1) A
′
12(c1)
A′21(c2) A
′
22(c2)
...
...
A′p1(cp)A
′
p2(cp)

T
(17)
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Where A′i1(ci) = {< ci, µA′i1(ci), γA′i1(ci), piA′i1(ci) >|ci ∈ L1} andA′i2(ci) = {< ci, µA′i2(ci), γA′i2(ci), piA′i2(ci) >|ci ∈ L2}, and the L1 and L2 denote the abnormal clustering
interval set AC and the normal clustering interval set NC
separately. In order to judgment whether the network is
abnormal or not based on multi-characteristic IFSs B′,
the IFWG is introduced to fuse IFSs of multiple network
characteristics to the linguistic variables.
Definition 2 (IFWG): Let αj = (µj , γj) be a collection of
IFS with the weight vector w = (w1, w2, . . . , wp)T such that
wj ∈ [0, 1] and
∑p
j wj = 1. An IFWG operator of dimension
p is a mapping: ωp → ω, and
IFWGω(α1, α2, ..., αp) = α
ω1
1 ⊕ αω22 ⊕ ...⊕ αωpp
= (
p∏
j=1
uωjaj , 1−
p∏
j=1
(1− vaj )ωj ))
(18)
Moreover, the weight wi of the ith network characteristic c
is calculated based on the distinction index τ of MFS-TL
characteristic, as the following equation (19):
wi =
τi∑p
i=1(τi)
. (19)
Using the IFWG, the IFS B′′ of MFS-TL structure to each of
linguistic variables is calculated as shown in equation(20).
Where the µB′i(C
′) is the degree of membership of the
network structure to the ith linguistic variable, the γB′i(C
′)
and piB′i(C
′) are the non-membership and hesitation of that.
Then, we defined a method of comparing multiple IFSs,
based on the score function and the precision function, to
obtain the defuzzification of the B′.
B′′ = IFWGω(B′)
=
(
{< C ′, µ(C ′), γ(C ′), pi(C ′) > |C ′ ∈ L1}
{< C ′, µ(C ′), γ(C ′), pi(C ′) > |C ′ ∈ L2}
)
(20)
Definition 3 (Score function [48]): For any intuitionistic
fuzzy set A =< µ, γ >, the score function S(A) of this IFS
is defined as follows:
S(A) = µ− γ, S(A) ∈ [−1, 1] (21)
It can be seen that the larger the value of S(A) is, the better
membership relationship the intuitionistic fuzzy set A is.
Definition 4 (Precision function [49]): For any intuitionistic
fuzzy set A =< µ, γ >, the precision function H(A) of this
IFS is defined as follows:
H(A) = µ+ γ, H(A) ∈ [0, 1] (22)
The larger the value of H(A) is, the higher the precision
degree of the intuitionistic fuzzy set A =< µ, γ > is.
For any tow intuitionistic fuzzy set A1 =< µ, γ > and
B =< µ, γ >, the followings hold true:
1) If S(A) < S(B), then A < B
2) If S(A) = S(B):
a) WhenH(A) = H(B), thenA = B, that isA and
B represent the same information.
b) When H(A) < H(B), then A < B.
Based on above rules, the two intuitionistic fuzz logic of the
B′′ can be compared each other. Then the sorted vector is
given R = {B′′1, B′′2}, and the B′′1 is the detection result
of our method.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to analyze the complex network feature of our
model and verify the anomaly detection performance of our
method, we use a variety of publicly available real Internet
traffic traces: (1) ISOT dataset, (2) CTU dataset, and (3) CI-
CIDS2017 dataset. These traces are non-sampled and include
up to layer-4 headers with no payload. In this section, our
works consist of the analysis of the MFS-TL parameters and
MFS-TL statistical characteristics, and the evaluation of our
anomaly detection method.
A. DATASET
The ISOT dataset is the combination of several existing pub-
licly available malicious and non-malicious datasets, such as
the abnormal dataset from the French chapter of the honeynet
project, and the normal datasets from the Traffic Lab at
Ericssion Research in Hungary and the Lawrence Berkeley
National Lab (LBNL) . As mentioned in Reference [50], the
experimental data is produced by merging multiple original
datasets into a single individual trace file. Based on this
combined traces, we selected two pieces of data: the LBNL
normal data on Jan 6, 2005 and Jan 7, 2005, and the ab-
normal data captured at 22:00−23:00 on Oct 7, 2010. Then,
having the normal traffic at 2005-01-06 20:00:00−2005-01-
07 00:26:00 and 2005-01-07 20:00:00−2005-01-08 00:26:00
as background traffic, the abnormal traffic is separately in-
jected into background traffic. Furthermore, we obtain the
experimental datasets ISOT-06 and ISOT-07 which include
the Storm and Waledac anomalous activities.
The CTU is a dataset of anomalous traffic that was cap-
tured in the CTU University, in 2011. The goal of the dataset
was to have a large capture of real botnet traffic mixed
with normal traffic. The CTU dataset consists in thirteen
captures of different botnet samples. On each sample a spe-
cific malware was executed, which used several protocols
and performed different actions. In this paper, the samples
CTU-4 and CTU-9 are adopted which executed the malicious
softwares Rbot and Neris, respectively [51].
The CICIDS2017 dataset contains benign and the most
up-to-date common attacks, which resembles the true real-
world data [52]. The data capturing period started at 9:00,
July 3, 2017 and ended at 17:00 on July 7, 2017, for a
total of 5 days. The first day is the normal day and only
includes the benign traffic. The implemented attacks include
Brute Force FTP, Brute Force SSH, DoS, Heartbleed, Web
Attack, Infiltration, Botnet, and DDoS. They have been ex-
ecuted both morning and afternoon on the other days. The
SSH-Patator(i.e. Brute Force SSH attack) and CICIDS-DoS
(including the DoS-Slowloris, DoS-Slowhttptest, DoS-Hulk,
DoS-GoldenEye, and DDoS-LOIT attacks) are selected in
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TABLE 1: Publicly available network traffic datasets from ISOT, CTU and CICIDS project.
Name Date/Time Duration Unique IPs 2-tuple flows 5-tuple flows Abnormal 5-tuple flows Packets Abnormal packets
ISOT-06 2005-01-06/20:00:00 4.33 hrs 14,492 35,362 142,955 32,945(23.05%) 8,946,619 370,099(4.41%)
ISOT-07 2005-01-07/20:00:00 4.00 hrs 13,906 31,269 137,307 32,945(23.99%) 10,001,278 370,099(3.70%)
CTU-4 2011-08-15/11:00:05 4.17 hrs 185,372 211,050 722,810 1,735(0.24%) 4,171,952 3,718(0.09%)
CTU-9 2011-08-17/12:01:01 5.18 hrs 366,096 455,340 1,178,257 93,736(7.96%) 8,003,477 382,708(4.78%)
CICIDS-SSH 2017-07-04/14:00:00 2.00 hrs 4,072 7,130 66,307 2,551(3.85%) 1,703,856 5,063(0.30%)
CICIDS-DoS 2017-07-05/09:47:00 3.86 hrs 6,658 12,870 169,144 24,357(14.40%) 6,904,454 294,218(4.26%)
our work. Moreover, the normal traffic from the fist traces
with corresponding time period of the attack event is also
extracted as the normal traffic of this attack.
Table 1 summarizes the captured time, the captured du-
ration, and the number of unique IPs, 2-tuple flows (f =
{sa, da}), 5-tuple flows (f = {sa, da, sp, dp, pr}), abnormal
5-tuple flows, network packets and abnormal packets. Noted
that the values in parentheses denote the percentage of the
abnormal flows. Based on existed data labels, we propose a
new label method because the MFS-TL is constructed on the
sampled traffic traces with a fixed time interval. Specifically,
we calculate the ratio γ between the number of abnormal
flows and the total flows in one sampled traffic traces. If the
ratio γ is not less than 0.001, this sample is labeled with
abnormal, otherwise it is normal.
Additionally, we have used four following common eval-
uation metrics: accuracy, precision, recall, and F-Measure.
Accuracy (Acc) is the percentage of all normal and anomaly
instances that are correctly classified. Precision (Pre) is the
percentage of correctly detected anomaly instances over all
detected anomaly instances. Recall (Rec) is the percentage
of anomaly instances correctly detected. F-Measure (F1) is a
harmonic combination of the precision Pre and recall Rec
into a single measure. Based on above definitions, we give
following equations:
Acc =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
Pre =
TP
TP + FP
Rec =
TP
TP + FN
F1 =
2 ∗ Pre ∗Rec
Pre+Rec
(23)
Where the True Positives (TP ) measures how many in-
stances of a given class are correctly classified; the True
Negatives (TN ) measures the number of correctly classified
instances of a class; the False Positives (FP ) measures how
many instances of other classes are confused with a given
class; and the False Negatives (FN ) measures the number of
misclassified instances of a class.
B. PARAMETER ANALYSIS OF THE MFS-TL
As defined in MFS-TL model, the temporal locality window
∆w and multivariate flow similarity critical threshold rc are
two key parameters which determine the connectivity among
the flows. Thus how to select an appropriate temporal locality
window and multivariate flow similarity critical threshold
are very important for MFS-TL structure. Theoretically, the
bigger ∆w or lower rc offers the higher connection prob-
ability of two flow nodes. As a result, the network density
of the MFS-TL increases with the above parameter values.
However, if the ∆w is big enough that the MFS-TL loses the
purpose of depicting the interaction relationship among the
flows. When the rc is close to 0, every flow becomes the iso-
lated node of the MFS-TL. Conversely, if the ∆w is too small
or the rc is too high, some valuable connections in MFS-TL
would be filtered. Thus the ∆w and rc should be determined
to the proper values by which the complex network MFS-TL
can capture the interactive feature of the network traffic flow
time series. For the purpose of constructing a proper MFS-
TL, a group of complex network characteristics are analyzed
as a function of the ∆w and rc, as shown in Fig.1.
First, the network traffic traces from the ISOT-06, CTU-9,
and CICIDS-SSH are split with the 1 minute sampling time.
Second, given the ∆w and rc, we can construct one MFS-TL
for one sampled traffic traces. Thus, each of traffic datasets
is translated into the MFS-TL sequences with the fixed ∆w
and rc. Then, we calculate the characteristics of all MFS-
TLs, such as the node number, edge number, mean degree,
max degree, clique, K-core, entropy, clustering coefficient,
assortative coefficient, SPL, diameter(mean), diameter(max)
and power-law of network degree distribution, as shown in
Table 2. Finally, the contour is used to plot the distributions
of the characteristic values as a function of the ∆w and rc.
Due to the space limitation, only four distributions including
the edge number, mean degree, SPL, and entropy of the CTU-
9 are presented in Fig.1. The statistical results from ISOT-
06, CTU-9, and CICIDS-SSH show that the distributions
about mean degree, clique, and K-core are similar with the
Fig.1a and 1b, the assortative, SPL, and diameter(max) are
similar with the Fig.1d. But the distribution of the clustering
or power-law is different from the other characteristics, and
is different with different datasets.
Observing the distributions of Fig.1, we found that the
values of edge or max degree increase linearly, the entropy
grows as a power of the ∆w, and the SPL decreases as a
power of the ∆w, when the rc is a fixed value. However,
when the ∆w is a fixed value, the values of edge, max
degree, and entropy decrease exponentially, and the SPL
grows exponentially. But, when the 0.6 < rc < 0.8, the
changes of the edge number and the max degree become
relatively slow. However, the entropy and SPL have mutation
correspondingly. As we all know, the lower the systemic
entropy is, the easier it is to accurately describe its micro-
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TABLE 2: The used characteristic metrics for the MFS-TL.
Characteristic Description
Node number The number of network nodes.
Edge number The number of network edges.
Mean Degree The average degree connectivity of a network.
Max Degree The maximum degree connectivity of a network.
MDR The ratio of the maximum degree in a network.
K-core The maximum sub-network in which node degree ≥ k.
Clique The number of the largest clique of a network.
Clustering The transitivity of all nodes in a network.
Assortative A preference for a network’s nodes to attach to others.
Entropy The measure of unpredictability of network structure.
SPL The average of shortest paths of all pairs of nodes.
Diameter(max) The maximum of shortest paths of all pairs of nodes.
Diameter(mean) The maximum of average paths of all pairs of nodes.
Power-law The slope of best-fit line for degree distribution.
scopic state [53]. Thus, in this paper the multivariate flow
similarity critical threshold rc is selected at the mutation
point, i.e. rc = 0.65. Meanwhile considering the IP latency,
that the communication latency within a country is usually
0.03s−0.05s and that between two countries, especially the
transcontinental, is 0.1s−0.15s 1, the temporal locality win-
dow ∆w is set as 0.1s.
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FIGURE 1: Distributions between temporal locality window
(∆w), multivariate flow similarity critical threshold rc and
MFS-TL characteristics values in CTU-9 dataset.
C. STATISTICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MFS-TL
In order to describe the structure feature of MFS-TL, 14
network characteristic metrics are introduced in Table 2.
Each of MFS-TL characteristic metrics will present specific
structure feature depending on itself definition. For instance,
the node number and edge number denote the network size.
The MDR shows the importance of max-degree node in a
network. The SPL and the diameter can evaluate the trans-
mission performance of a network. The power-law points
out the node preference attachment in a network. In this
section, the CTU-9 dataset is used to study the dynamical
1http://www.verizonenterprise.com/about/network/latency/
evolution of the MFS-TLs with anomaly events. Based on
above method, the sampling MFS-TL was constructed, the
MFS-TL characteristics were calculated, and then the char-
acteristic values was plotted as a function of time. But due
to the space limitation, in Fig.2 we only exhibit the dynamic
evolution of some characteristics including the edge number,
max degree, SPL and assortative coefficient. Following the
method proposed in Section V-A, the real network states (i.e.,
normal or abnormal) are labeled over time tick. In Fig.2,
the left green area and right red area of each sub-figure de-
note normal traffic and attack traffic. Clearly, the correlation
between the network characteristic evolution and network
states can be classified into three types: positive correlation,
negative correlation and non-correlation. For instance, in
the CTU-9 dataset the evolutions of the node number, edge
number, mean degree, clustering, K-core, clique and entropy
are positive correlative with network states (e.g. Fig.2a),
those of the SPL, diameter(mean), and diameter(max) are
negative correlative with network states (e.g. Fig.2c and 2d),
and the MDR, max degree, power-law are non-correlative
with network states (e.g. Fig.2b). It suggests that the MFS-TL
characteristic measurement will be a effective method for In-
ternet traffic anomaly detection. Further analysis shows that
the correlation between MFS-TL characteristic and network
state is non-deterministic in a datasets.
According to observing the distributions of network char-
acteristics, we found the normal state’s values of most of net-
work characteristics follow the Gaussian distribution. Thus,
we define a simple rule for the statistical characteristic: the
sampling MFS-TL is anomaly if the network characteristic
value ci is lower than the ψ in which the ψ indicates the
abnormal threshold for a given network characteristic se-
quence. So the threshold ψ is related to the performance of
the anomaly detection. Given a confidence interval θ, the
threshold ψ can be computed by ψ = µ + λσ, where µ
and σ denote the mean and the standard deviation of one
characteristic sequence C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn}. And the λ is
the quantile of the normal distribution corresponding to the
given confidence interval θ [54]. In this paper, the ε is 0.1
that confidence level of a MFS-TL characteristic sequence
is 1 − ε = 0.9. Accordingly, the best detection metrics of
CTU-9 MFS-TLs is the SPL, 0.9383, and the worst one is
the diameter(max), 0.2469.
D. SINGLE CHARACTERISTIC-BASED ANOMALY
DETECTION
To analyze the evolution of MFS-TLs characteristics in all
datasets, we found that there are the positive correlation,
negative correlation and non-correlation between network
characteristic and network states. For this reason, we use the
intuitionistic fuzzy set (IFS) to quantify the non-deterministic
correlations, that is let membership degree, non-membership
degree, and hesitation degree of the IFS describe the positive
correlation, negative correlation and non-correlation.
First, we calculate the anomaly detection accuracy (Acc)
based on the IFS of single MFS-TL characteristic, as shown
10 VOLUME 4, 2016
J. Wang et al.: Using Intuitionistic Fuzzy Set for Anomaly Detection of Network Traffic from Flow Interaction
                                            
 7 L P H
   
   î    
   î    
   î    
 ( G
 J H
  1
 X P
 E H
 U   D 
                                            
 7 L P H
    
    
    
 0
 D [
  G
 H J
 U H
 H
  E 
                                            
 7 L P H
   
   
   
 6 3
 /
  F 
                                            
 7 L P H
    
    
    
 $
 V V
 R U
 W D
 W L Y
 H
  G 
FIGURE 2: The characteristic evolution of MFS-TLs from
the CTU-9 dataset. (a) edge number vs. time, (b) max degree
vs. time, (c) shortest path length (SPL) vs. time, and (d)
assortative vs. time. The left green area and right red area
of each sub-figure denote normal traffic and attack traffic.
The dashed lines of each of sub-figures represent the upper
and lower of the confidence interval with the confidence level
1− α = 0.9
in Table 3. It can be found that the different characteristics
have different detection performance in a dataset. For in-
stance the Acc values in ISOT-06, the best is 0.8520 from
the node number and the worst is 0.2996 from the power-
law. The accuracy of a MFS-TL characteristic is different
with different datasets yet. For example, the MDR gets the
best performance in ISOT-07, CICIDS-SSH, and CICIDS-
DoS, but is the third worst metric in CTU-4. Thus, the
results indicate that MFS-TL characteristics are inconsistent
for anomaly detection performance. In Table 3, the best Acc
is 0.8520 for ISOT-06, 0.7148 for ISOT-07, 0.5755 for CTU-
4, 0.8875 for CTU-9, 0.9019 for CICIDS-SSH and 0.8510 for
CICIDS-DoS. The higherAcc suggests that the correlation is
more significant between network characteristic and network
states.
In order to exhibit the detection results of the best MFS-
TL characteristic of each of datasets, we have plotted the
IFS distributions of the best characteristic over two linguistic
variables: abnormal and normal. The Fig.3 describes the
membership degree µ, non-membership degree γ and hesi-
tation degree pi of sampling MFS-TLs. Apparently, the larger
the red bar µ is, the higher probability the current network
state should belong to this linguistic variable. For instance
the IFS of the CTU-9 mean degree in Fig.3d, the anomaly
happens continuously in the second half of the captured time.
At the abnormal time ticks, the top sub-figure Abnormal
shows that the µ is greater than the γ and pi. In the bottom
sub-figure Normal, the values of γ are in the range of [0.9, 1].
It indicates that the state of this network should belong to the
linguistic variable abnormal. Through comparative analysis
with the anomaly event, we found that the detection results
are accurate. Moreover, based on above analysis process, it
can be seen that the others have similarity detection results.
(a) ISOT-06 Node (b) ISOT-07 MDR
(c) CTU-4 SPL (d) CTU-9 Mean degree
(e) CICIDS-SSH MDR (f) CICIDS-DoS MDR
FIGURE 3: The distribution of membership degree µ (red bar
with slash), non-membership degree γ (green bar with black
point) and hesitation degree pi (blue bar with backslash) over
two linguistic variables as a function of time ticks for the
best MFS-TL characteristic in each datasets. For each of the
sequences of temporal network (a)-(f), it is abnormal, if the
top ribbon is colored cyan at the time tick i, and vice versa.
And the two bottom figures depict the abnormal and normal
states, respectively.
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TABLE 3: The detection accuracy (Acc) based on single MFS-TL characteristic over different datasets. The bolded value is the
best detection value.
Characteristic ISOT-06 ISOT-07 CTU-4 CTU-9 CICIDS-SSH CICIDS-DoS
Node number 0.8520 0.5064 0.473 0.8026 0.523 0.5104
Edge number 0.6968 0.4477 0.5423 0.8637 0.4062 0.4616
Mean Degree 0.7589 0.3813 0.4744 0.8875 0.4834 0.4454
Max Degree 0.6972 0.5613 0.4077 0.7107 0.8242 0.6177
MDR 0.5776 0.7148 0.3941 0.5299 0.9019 0.8510
K-core 0.7475 0.4363 0.449 0.887 0.5055 0.4973
Clique 0.7842 0.4162 0.3803 0.8383 0.4707 0.5047
Clustering 0.794 0.6879 0.5327 0.6508 0.6202 0.4831
Assortative 0.4708 0.5468 0.4818 0.8252 0.8384 0.8142
Entropy 0.7546 0.5197 0.5095 0.8583 0.4846 0.4972
SPL 0.5433 0.4538 0.5755 0.8668 0.8282 0.725
Diameter(max) 0.4255 0.4012 0.4805 0.7455 0.6792 0.5209
Diameter(mean) 0.4237 0.4344 0.3858 0.7123 0.6944 0.5162
Power-law 0.2996 0.2593 0.4099 0.549 0.5398 0.5194
In the above, using MFS-TL characteristic to describe
network states is verified as shown in Table 3 and Fig.3. The
single MFS-TL characteristic IFS-based anomaly detection
has a good detection performance for all datasets.
E. MULTIPLE CHARACTERISTICS-BASED ENSEMBLE
DETECTION
The above inconsistent performance of MFS-TL character-
istic to network state motivates us to develope an ensemble
method (IFSE-AD) for multiple MFS-TL characteristics to
eliminate the impacts of the inconsistent and improve detect
accuracy. In this paper, the performance of our method is
analyzed by using the detection accuracy Acc, detection
precision Pre, detection recall Rec, and F1. Table 4 shows
the results of anomaly detection based on IFSE-AD. The
TP , TF , FP , and FN denote the number of corresponding
detected instances in testing set. For the detection accuracy
Acc, it can be seen that all are greater than 0.94 except
for the CTU-4. That is because the distinction index τ of
all MFS-TL characteristics in CTU-4 are lower than 0.5.
In other words, there are weak correlations between CTU-
4 characteristics and network states. The characteristics field
in Table 4 shows the used characteristics in IFSE-AD method
with the distinction index threshold τc = 0.5. Noted that
the used characteristics in CTU-4 are with the three best
distinction index τ , even though they are not greater than
0.5. Comparative analysis between Pre and Rec, it is in-
ferred that the big number of false positive FP in detection
results declines the detection precision Pre. It inspires us
the future work about anomaly detection based on MFS-
TL characteristic metrics. Fig.3 shows that CTU-9, CICIDS-
SSH, and CICIDS-DoS data have more abnormal instances,
and in Table4 they have also higher F1. It suggests that the
more abnormal data improves the detection performance of
IFSE-AD. Additionally, the study of the relationship between
detection performance and the distinction index threshold τc
denotes that the value of the τc have negligible influence to
the detection performance.
Besides, the relationship between the clustering interval
size c and the detection accuracy Acc was studied. In Fig.4,
it shows the trends of ISOT-07, CTU-04, CTU-09, CICIDS-
SSH, and CICIDS-DoS follow logarithmic distribution. Ex-
cept that the ISOT-06’s accuracies have sudden changes at
the clusters c = 7, 8, 9. It can be seen when the c = 10, there
are good detection performances for all datasets overall. So
in this paper the clustering interval size is set as 10 during
partitioning the domain of discourse D.
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FIGURE 4: The relationship between the accuracy Acc and
the clustering interval size.
F. EVALUATION
Finally, the comparison of anomaly detection performance
has been implemented by different methods. In this paper, we
select three existed algorithms including K-Means+ID3 [55],
Adaboost [56], and FIRE [57] in which the K-Means+ID3
and Adaboost, two of the most commonly used machine
learning methods, detect the anomalies on the flow features
extracted from the network traces, and the FIRE used the
statistical metrics (e.g. the number of a port or the sdp) of the
network traces to construct the fuzzy logic to assess whether
malicious activity is taking place. However, the FIRE and the
methods based on MFS-TL is constructed on the sampled
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TABLE 4: The performance of anomaly detection based on our method.
Dataset Characteristic TP TF FP FN Acc Pre Rec F1
ISOT-06 Node, Edge, Mean degree, Clique, Clustering,
Entropy, K-Core, Max degree.
8 43 3 0 0.9444 0.7273 1.0000 0.8421
ISOT-07 Node, MDR, Clustering. 7 42 1 1 0.9608 0.8750 0.8750 0.8750
CTU-4 Entropy, Edge, Mean Degree. 18 22 10 1 0.7843 0.6423 0.9474 0.7660
CTU-9 SPL, Mean Degree, K-Core, Edge, Entropy,
Assortative, Clique, Node, Diameter(mean),
Diameter(max).
34 26 1 0 0.9836 0.9714 1.0000 0.9855
CICIDS-SSH SPL, MDR, Max degree, Assortative. 13 18 0 1 0.9688 1.0000 0.9286 0.9630
CICIDS-DOS MDR, Assortative. 15 21 1 0 0.9730 0.9375 1.0000 0.9677
TABLE 5: Comparison of the accuracy/F1 of anomaly detection by different methods.
Dataset K-Means+ID3 Adaboost FIRE Gaussian-Dist IFS-AD IFSE-AD
ISOT-06 0.7871 / 0.8370 0.9730 / 0.9793 0.8410 / 0.9695 0.9705 / 0.9811 0.8520 / 0.7022 0.9444 / 0.8421
ISOT-07 0.6519 / 0.7448 0.8640 / 0.9218 0.9347 / 0.9650 0.7222 / 0.7826 0.7148 / 0.5180 0.9608 / 0.8750
CTU-4 0.9898 / 0.9011 0.7120 / 0.8296 0.8280 / 0.9043 0.5517 / 0.6422 0.5755 / 0.4427 0.7843 / 0.7660
CTU-9 0.7861 / 0.7987 0.5590 / 0.7153 0.7245 / 0.7700 0.9383 / 0.9667 0.8875 / 0.9059 0.9836 / 0.9855
CICIDS-SSH 0.7734 / 0.8043 0.8330 / 0.9441 0.8185 / 0.8592 0.8272 / 0.8940 0.9019 / 0.8832 0.9688 / 0.9630
CICIDS-DoS 0.8055 / 0.8586 0.8880 / 0.9280 0.5020 / 0.6586 0.9483 / 0.9697 0.8510 / 0.8192 0.9730 / 0.9677
network traces with 1 minute sampling interval. So, the sizes
of training set and testing set are far less than those of the
K-Means+ID3 and Adaboost. Moreover, the Gaussian-Dist
represents the anomaly detection method based on Gaussian
distribution mentioned in the Section V-C. The IFS-AD
represents the single characteristic-based anomaly detection
method proposed in the Section V-D. In this paper, the IFS-
AD and IFSE-AD methods makes a fuzzification for every
characteristic value to two states’ linguist variables, and find
which represents a best membership degree with multiple
characteristics. In Table 5, the values denote the anomaly
detection accuracy Acc and F1 separately. According to the
comparison results, we found that the detection accuracyAcc
of the IFSE-AD are far better than that of K-Means+ID3,
Adaboost, and FIRE. Although, the IFS-AD Acc and F1 are
lower than the Gaussian-Dist, the IFS provide a good enough
expression mechanism for the correlations between MFS-TL
characteristic and network states that the IFSE-AD based on
multiple characteristics has a better anomaly performance
than the Gaussian-Dist. Additionally, we found that the meth-
ods based on the flow statistics and flow interaction have
different sensitivity to the traffic data. Specifically, the K-
Means+ID3, Adaboost, and FIRE based on the flow statistics
have a better performance for what contains fewer anomaly
activities. The Gaussian-Dist, IFS-AD, and IFSE-AD based
on the flow interaction have a better performance for what
contains more anomaly activities.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work we have proposed the intuitionistic fuzzy set
ensemble method (IFSE-AD) for anomaly detection of net-
work traffic from the perspective of flow interaction. On the
one hand, the multivariate flow similarity complex network
model (MFS-TL) not only describe the interaction behav-
iors of large scale network flows, but also can monitor the
dynamics of network traffic flows. On the other hand, our
quantitative evaluation for network anomaly behaviors on
publicly available network traffic datasets with ground truth
show that building the IFSE-AD is effective in boosting
detection performance.
Initially, based on complex network theory, a complex net-
work model, i.e. MFS-TL, is constructed by computing the
multivariate flow similarity on temporal locality. Analyzing
the relationships between MFS-TL characteristics, temporal
locality window ∆w, and multivariate flow similarity critical
threshold rc, an approach for parameter determination is es-
tablished, i.e. finding the mutation point of MFS-TL entropy
and SPL, and considering the communication latency. Thus,
as shown in Fig.1 the parameters are set as ∆w = 0.1s and
rc = 0.65 which exhibit the complexity and dynamic of
network traffic. Observing the evolution of statistical charac-
teristics of the MFS-TLs, three non-deterministic correlation
types between MFS-TL characteristic and network state are
defined, i.e. positive correlation (e.g. Fig.2a), negative cor-
relation (e.g. Fig.2c and Fig.2d), and non-correlation (e.g.
Fig.2b).
Then, we introduced the intuitionistic fuzzy set (IFS)
to quantify the correlation between MFS-TL characteristic
and network state, i.e. membership degree of the IFS for
positive correlation, non-membership degree of the IFS for
negative correlation, and hesitation degree of the IFS for
non-correlation. Furthermore, for a MFS-TL characteristic
sequence, a IFS-based anomaly detection method (IFS-AD)
is put forward to detect traffic anomalies. In IFS-AD, a Gaus-
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sian distribution-based membership function with a variable
hesitation degree is designed to express the objectivity of
intuitionistic fuzzification. The proposed distinction index
resolves the mapping problem from multiple clustering inter-
vals of the IFS to two states’ linguistic variables. According
to the accuracies in Table 3, we find the MDR obtains the
best performance in ISOT-07 (Acc=0.7148), CICIDS-SSH
(Acc=0.9019), and CICIDS-DoS (Acc=0.8510). Overall, ev-
ery MFS-TL characteristic has different performance in a
dataset, and the performance of a characteristic is also differ-
ent with different datasets. It shows the inconsistent behav-
iors about MFS-TL characteristic to network state. Therefore,
the intuitionistic fuzzy set ensemble method (IFSE-AD) is
proposed to fuse the IFSs of multiple MFS-TL characteristics
to eliminate the impacts of the inconsistent performance. The
score function and precision function are used to sort the
fused IFS.
Finally we carried out extensive experiments on several
network traffic datasets for anomaly detection. The detect
accuracy/F1 of the IFS-AD are 0.9444/0.8421 for ISOT-
06, 0.9608/0.8750 for ISOT-07, 0.7843/0.7660 for CTU-4,
0.9836/0.9855 for CTU-9, 0.9688/0.9630 for CICIDS-SSH,
and 0.9730/0.9677 for CICIDS-DoS. The results demonstrate
the superiority of our method to state-of-the-art approaches,
validating the effectiveness of our method. Additionally, the
methods based on the flow statistics and flow interaction have
different sensitivity to the data: the K-Means+ID3, Adaboost,
and FIRE based on the flow statistics have a better perfor-
mance in network traffic containing fewer anomaly activities.
The Gaussian-Dist, IFS-AD, and IFSE-AD based on the flow
interaction have a better performance in which contains more
anomaly activities. All source code of our methods, the data
used in this work, and the more charts about parameters
analysis and statistical characteristics of MFS-TL are shared
openly at http://file.mervin.me/project/internet-mfstl-ad
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